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The Traditional Courts Bill in the Context of Other Laws 
Dealing with Traditional Leadership  
Aninka Claassens 
The Traditional Courts Bill cannot be understood in isolation from the package of other laws 
dealing with the powers of traditional leaders. The first of these laws is the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003. The Framework Act has since been 
complemented by provincial laws dealing with traditional leadership enacted in the different 
provinces.  
The second major law is the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) of 2004, the controversial 
national law dealing with the powers of traditional councils in relation to land administration 
and transfer of title. The CLRA has not yet been brought into operation. Various rural 
communities have challenged its validity on the basis that the parliamentary procedure was 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and that its provisions breach the equality and tenure 
security provisions of the Constitution. The case was heard in the Pretoria High Court in 
October 2008 and judgment is still outstanding (as at October 2009).  
Opposition to the package of laws does not stem from opposition to the institution of 
traditional leadership, or to customary law. There is widespread acceptance of the valuable 
role played by customary law and the need for indigenous legal processes to be recognised 
and supported. The controversy relates to the distortion of customary law, and the way in 
which the new laws bolster unilateral chiefly power and undermine indigenous accountability 
mechanisms thereby impacting on power relations in former homeland areas. The laws are 
criticised for entrenching the colonial and apartheid distortions and divisions that were central 
to the creation of the Bantustan political system and used to justify the denial of equal 
citizenship to all South Africans  
This short document argues that the Traditional Courts bill, in the context of the package of 
other laws, undermines the 2007 ANC Polokwane resolution to:  
Ensure that the allocation of customary land be democratised in a manner 
which empowers rural women and supports the building of democratic 
community structures at village level, capable of driving and coordinating 
local development processes. The ANC will further engage with traditional 
leaders, including Contralesa, to ensure that disposal of land without proper 
consultation with communities and local government is discontinued.  
The documents starts by explaining how the package of laws fits together. It highlights three 
interrelated issues:  
• !How the laws entrench the apartheid myth of discrete tribes neatly abutting one 
another 
• !The nature of the powers given to traditional leaders and the implications for power 
relations in rural areas  
• The impact on women and on current processes of positive change in rural areas  
It ends with reflections about whose interests the laws serve, the background to their 
enactment, their implications in terms of customary law and of relegating rural South Africans 
to the status of second class citizens in the country of their birth.  
Discussion of the package of traditional leadership laws and how they relate to one 
another  
The core law in the package is the 2003 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act. Section 28 of the Framework Act provides for transitional mechanisms. It deems existing 
tribal authorities to be traditional councils provided they comply with new composition 
requirements.1 The requirements are that 40% of the members of a traditional council must 
be elected and 30% must be women.2  
                                               
1 The Framework Act provided they must meet the requirements within a year, however very few 
managed to meet this deadline, which was extended by the provincial laws (many of which were 
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Section 28 entrenches the controversial tribal authority boundaries established in terms of the 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. These were established virtually wall-to-wall throughout the 
former homelands and formed the basic building blocks of the Bantustan political system, 
functioning effectively as the equivalent of local government in rural areas.  
The overlay of fixed tribal boundaries  
According to the census 17 million people live in the former homelands where the new laws 
apply, and women constitute 59% of the population of these areas. In many areas the tribal 
authority boundaries that were imposed in terms of the 1951 Act are historically controversial, 
having precipitated uprisings in areas such as Pondoland, Sekhukhuneland and Zeerust. 
Those traditional leaders who supported the Bantustan agenda were often rewarded with 
large areas, and those who resisted stripped of their power or relegated to headman status 
and confined to small areas. In many areas disputes about “tribal” boundaries, legitimate 
authority and grazing land remain ongoing.  
Moreover the reality of intermixed and changing identities in rural areas belies the rigid super-
imposed apartheid map of discrete “tribes” neatly abutting one another. People with different 
identities who clubbed together to purchase land, or lived on mission settlements, or moved 
from distant areas to be near work, or were evicted from “black spots” and dumped in the 
reserves, suddenly found themselves defined as the “tribal subjects” of leaders with whom 
they had little or no shared history.  
During apartheid millions of people were forcibly removed during the process of “Bantustan 
consolidation” in an effort to try to bring the untidy reality of intermingled identities in line with 
the mythology of “separate tribes” each with their own homeland. Time and again Bantustan 
consolidation removals led to suffering and impoverishment, causing particular havoc in 
“mixed” areas such as Bushbuckridge and northern Limpopo. Currently hundreds of 
thousands of people are in the process of claiming restitution of land in the ethnically mixed 
areas where they lived before.  
Widespread rural uprisings brought the Bantustan political system to its knees during the late 
80s and early 90s. These uprisings played a key role in the demise of grand apartheid and 
the transition to democracy. Rural people demanded equal citizenship in a united South Africa 
and rejected their status as tribal subjects of separate ethnic “homelands”. At that time the 
army was deployed in many rural areas to protect tribal authority offices from angry residents 
protesting against abuse of power and the extortion of excessive tribal levies.  
In this context it is ironic that the new laws entrench controversial apartheid boundaries and 
provide traditional leaders with far reaching powers over people living within ethnically defined 
tribal boundaries.  
Powers vested in traditional leaders and traditional councils  
The Framework Act itself does not provide traditional leaders with much statutory power. 
Instead through its transitional mechanisms it entrenches existing traditional structure and 
boundaries as the “officially recognised” traditional structures and boundaries of the future. 
The “reform” component lies in the new composition requirements.  
Section 20 of the Framework Act specifies that national or provincial government may enact 
laws providing a role for traditional councils or traditional leaders in relation to a wide range of 
issues including (but not limited to) land administration, health, welfare, the administration of 
justice, safety and security, economic development and the management of natural 
resources.  
The Framework Act and the CLRA  
It is thus other laws such as the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 and the Traditional 
Courts bill that provide traditional leaders with substantive powers, rather than the Framework 
                                                                                                                                      
enacted in 2005) providing an additional year.  However by 2008 many had not yet changed their 
composition and the 2008 TLGFA amendment bill proposes an additional four years.   
2 It is important to note that the women need not be elected.  Instead they may be appointed by “the 
senior traditional leader”.  Furthermore the 30% quota for women may be decreased where insufficient 
women are “available.” 
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Act per se. Both the Framework Act and the Communal Land Rights Act were enacted during 
the build-up to the 2004 election. The traditional leadership lobby initially rejected the 
Framework bill as too weak. There were threats that unless the Framework bill was amended 
traditional leaders would boycott the elections. However most traditional leaders withdrew 
their objections when the draft Communal Land Rights bill was amended to provide that 
traditional councils would be given control over land administration. The Communal Land 
Rights bill also enabled the transfer of title to traditional communities and enabled the Minister 
to endorse title deeds held by Trusts and Communal Property Associations to the 
“community”. Many traditional leaders were unhappy about such institutions having separate 
title to land reform land within “their” areas.  
Prior drafts of the Communal Land Rights bill had provided for elected land administration 
committees. However the last minute amendments meant that elections would be held only in 
those areas where tribal authorities refused to comply with the new composition 
requirements, in which case traditional leaders would be cut out of a role in land 
administration entirely. It was a carrot and stick approach. Those who cooperated with the 
Framework Act’s new composition requirements would get control over land as the “carrot”, 
while those who boycotted the new requirements would be “punished” by having elected 
structures in their areas and being deprived of any role in land administration.  
As already mentioned, the legal validity of the CLRA is being challenged by four rural 
communities. They argue that instead of enhancing their security of tenure as required by 
section 25(6) of the Constitution, the Act undermines their tenure security by giving far-
reaching powers to traditional councils who cannot be held accountable.  
The CLRA case highlights the dangers of entrenching old tribal authority boundaries as the 
default boundaries for land administration. Some of the applicants have no historical 
connection with imposed traditional councils that claim power over them, others dispute the 
centralised nature of the powers vested in traditional councils, and point out that this 
undermines existing more participatory decision-making processes at the local and family 
level.  
In response to the CLRA application the Director General of the Department of Provincial and 
Local Government stated in her answering affidavit:  
“The traditional councils have clearly defined areas of jurisdiction. Those who find 
themselves in those areas must adjust to the rules and traditional practices of that 
area.”3  
Seventeen million South Africans live within the former homelands and so find themselves 
within one or other traditional council jurisdictional area. The reality is that many people 
dispute the legitimacy of those boundaries and question the content of the rules and 
traditional practices laid down by traditional leaders. Not necessarily because they are 
opposed to custom and tradition, but because they are involved in disputes about the 
unilateral actions and self seeking versions of customary law put forward by some traditional 
leaders.  
The Framework Act and the Traditional Courts bill  
The Traditional Courts bill gives traditional leaders far reaching power to determine the 
content of customary law. Like the CLRA, the bill provides no recognition of decision making 
authority and dispute resolution at family or village level. The only level at which traditional 
courts are recognised is at traditional council level. The bill vests statutory power in the 
presiding officer of a traditional court, who must be an officially recognised senior traditional 
leader or his delegate. No role, functions or support is provided for village level councils, nor 
to the council members who, in practice, play the pre-eminent role in existing customary 
courts. In this respect the bill follows the precedent set by the Black Administration Act of 
1927, except that the Black Administration Act does at least provide for the recognition of 
headmen’s courts.  
The bill makes it an offence not to appear before a customary court once summoned by the 
senior traditional leader as presiding officer.4 The courts jurisdictional areas are based on the 
                                               
3 Para 45.1 of answering affidavit by Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela. 
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old tribal authority boundaries, which are controversial in many areas because they 
incorporate groups who may have no historical affiliation with the chief, or do not recognise 
his authority.  
The decisions of the court (which are decisions made by the presiding officer) have the legal 
status of rulings made by the magistrates’ courts. Traditional courts (in the person of the 
senior traditional leader) have the authority to order unpaid labour, and to strip people of 
“customary entitlements”. Land rights are one such entitlement, community membership is 
another.  
The bill has far reaching consequences for those who dare to dispute the authority of 
traditional leaders. The bill enables the court, in the person of the presiding officer, to 
determine the content of customary law, notwithstanding contestations about its content in 
many areas. Common examples include contestation about traditional leaders “selling” land 
allocations for khonza fees, entering into unilateral mining deals or tourism ventures with 
outside investors, or demanding tribal levies for cars and lobola payments despite the state 
salaries they receive.  
In many areas rural people disputes these practices as a distortion of custom and insist that in 
the past key decisions were discussed and taken by those directly affected (including at 
family and village level) and not by centralised councils. Furthermore the bill centralises 
authority within traditional courts to the senior traditional leader as presiding officer, providing 
him with the power to summon and punish those who challenge his version of customary law. 
The court is empowered to impose additional sanctions for non compliance “according to 
customary law”  
Implications for indigenous accountability mechanisms  
The unilateral power of the presiding officer to deprive people of customary entitlements is 
inconsistent with the underlying principles and practice of customary law. In most areas 
serious decisions concerning the deprivation of rights must first be debated at various levels, 
for example at the family, clan and village level, and finally at a pitso, or general meeting of 
the entire community.  
The layered nature of customary institutions is well documented in academic literature, as is 
its central role in mediating and balancing power. Leaders are forced to take into account the 
views and deliberations of other levels of authority which provide people with alternative 
forums in which to express their views. The power of different levels in the traditional 
hierarchy expands and contracts depending on the confidence people have in leaders at the 
different levels. Unpopular or dictatorial traditional leaders will find sub-groupings referring 
fewer and fewer issues to them, and instead dealing with issues internally at lower levels. 
Secession was historically a primary mechanism of accountability in customary systems, and 
the underlying dynamic continues to be played out in myriad disputes concerning the status of 
chiefs and headmen relative to one another.  
However once fixed jurisdictional boundaries are imposed by the state, and traditional leaders 
are given centralised statutory authority within those boundaries, the dynamics of indigenous 
accountability are fundamentally undermined.  
The impact on women and on current processes of positive change in rural areas  
Women’s opposition to the bill  
Women have been at the forefront of opposition to the new traditional leadership laws and the 
Traditional Courts bill. The Commission for Gender Equality opposed the bill, as did the 
Women’s Legal Centre and the Rural Women’s Movement of Kwa Zulu Natal. The 
parliamentary Joint Monitoring Committee on the Quality of Life and Status of Women also 
made a submission criticising the bill and calling for joint sittings with the Justice Portfolio 
committee  
                                                                                                                                      
4 The South African Law Commission recommended that people must have the right to opt out of 
customary courts, and appear before another court instead, should they so desire. Traditional leaders 
strongly opposed “opting out” on the basis that it undermines their authority.  This was their main 
objection to the 2003 Law Commission report and draft bill, which subsequently disappeared without 
trace. 
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They argued that the bill would reinforce the patriarchal power relations that have 
discriminated against women in the past and potentially reverse some of the positive changes 
women have managed to win over the last 15 years. These positive changes include more 
single mothers being allocated land for residential sites, and more daughters being chosen to 
inherit responsibility for the natal homes they have supported over the years. The changes 
are uneven and have been hard fought. Many rural women still face the threat of eviction 
when their marriages end, or their brothers inherit their family homes. Moreover serious and 
significant obstacles remain in relation to women’s status and unequal bargaining position in 
rural areas contributing to ongoing problems of violence and abuse.  
However many women have taken advantage of the post-apartheid political environment and 
its focus on the values of equality and democracy to push for more equal access to 
resources, and in particular for residential sites for families headed by single mothers. They 
have justified these changes as consistent with the underlying customary principle that 
member families are entitled to land to fulfil their basic needs. The post apartheid political 
environment has meant that traditional leaders have had to be careful in relation to women, or 
risk reinforcing their reputation for patriarchy as they did when they opposed the equality 
provisions during the Constitutional negotiations.  
Women’s organisations are concerned that the new laws symbolise a shift in governments 
previously unequivocal support for the principles of equality and equal citizenship rights in 
rural areas which will have far reaching implications on the balance of power within which 
women struggle for change at the local level. The bill removes the incentive for traditional 
leaders to accommodate the countervailing views of women in the interpretation and 
development of customary law. This is not to say that all traditional leaders are insensitive to 
the plight of rural women, many have supported the processes of change that are underway, 
but others continue to oppose women’s appointment as traditional leaders, and frown on 
women’s attempts to speak out or represent themselves in traditional courts. In this regard 
traditional leaders’ opposition to the 30% quota for women in the TLGFA is instructive. It was 
because of chiefly opposition that a provision was inserted enabling the quota to be 
decreased despite the fact that women constitute 59% of the population in “tribal areas”.  
Women’s concerns about the changing balance of power heralded by the new laws are borne 
out by reports of newly appointed women members not being informed of traditional council 
meetings in some parts of Kwa Zulu Natal, reports of traditional councils justifying the banning 
of community meetings in North West and Eastern Cape by reference to the new laws, and 
the resurgence at scale of traditional leaders extorting excessive tribal levies in Limpopo.  
What the bill says about women  
Contrary to the South African Law Commission recommendations the Traditional Courts bill 
does not require the courts to include women members. However it contains a general 
provision that the presiding officer must ensure that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights 
are observed and respected, and in particular “that women are afforded full and equal 
participation in the proceedings, as men are”.  
Instead of including specific provisions to address the problems faced by women in traditional 
courts, it puts the onus on the presiding officer to ensure that women are fairly treated. This 
means that when problems arise women cannot demand the enforcement of clear legal 
provisions; instead they are forced to direct their challenges at the failure of the presiding 
officer. This is a heavy burden to place on women given the unequal power dynamics in rural 
areas, and the isolation and poverty of many rural women.  
The two most serious problems facing women in traditional courts is that generally the courts 
are composed of male councillors who are not sympathetic to women’s issues, and women 
are not allowed to speak or represent themselves, but have to rely on male relatives to put 
their case. This puts women at a serious disadvantage, particularly in cases arising from 
disputes with their male relatives, or where they have no adult male relatives available to 
represent them.  
Clause 9(3)(a) bars lawyers from traditional courts. Clause 9(3)(b) provides that a party may 
be represented by “his or her wife or husband, family member, neighbour or member of the 
community, in accordance with customary law and custom”. Instead of providing explicitly that 
women should be allowed to represent themselves if they so choose, the bill enables the 
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continuation of the practice of male relatives representing women “in accordance with 
customary law and custom”. This is justified on the basis that men, too, may be represented 
by their wives; a far-fetched possibility which attempts to cloak the continuation of inequality in 
even-handedness.  
South African citizens or tribal subjects?  
The bill is justified as urgently necessary so that the provisions of the discriminatory 1927 
Black Administration Act dealing with tribal courts can finally be repealed. In this urgency we 
should not lose sight of the reasons that some sections of the Black Administration Act are 
still in force and why it took so long to repeal the hated Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. For 
years the South African Law Commission’s attempts to introduce measures to replace these 
laws were rebuffed by the traditional leadership lobby, which opposed the repeal of their old 
apartheid powers until other laws securing their position were put in place.  
It is instructive that the Law Commission’s 2003 recommendations in respect of customary 
courts and its draft bill are not reflected in the current bill, or even mentioned in the 
memorandum accompanying the bill which states that the bill was drafted in consultation with 
the National House of Traditional Leaders. Traditional leaders had objected to the Law 
Commission’s recommendation that “opting out” of the jurisdiction of customary courts must 
be allowed. They said that it would undermine their authority if people living within their 
jurisdictional areas were able to choose to appear in the magistrates’ courts or high courts 
instead.  
Because tribal authorities were established virtually wall-to-wall in the former homelands, this 
means the 17 million people who live in those areas cannot opt of courts run by traditional 
leaders they do not necessarily support. It deprives those 17 million South Africans of the 
right to be represented by a lawyer, or to represent themselves if they are women. Moreover it 
makes them vulnerable to the extraordinary sanctions proposed by the bill, including forced 
labour and the cancellation of customary entitlements.  
Who makes customary law?  
The bill authorises the senior traditional leader, as presiding officer, to unilaterally determine 
the content of customary law. This undermines the democratic potential inherent in current 
processes of mutual accommodation taking place in rural areas, as women and men 
negotiate and develop ways of combining the underlying values of customary law with the 
principles of the Constitution. Living customary law grows out of processes of adaptation and 
change that reflect the voices, views and struggles of a range of different interests and 
sectors in rural society. Instead of encouraging the process of democratisation that is 
underway, the bill ignores the reality that it is councillors and community members who play 
the pre-eminent role in interrogating and debating the merits of cases in customary courts, 
and centralises authority exclusively in the presiding officer.  
Traditional leaders have long resisted the establishment of elected local government in their 
areas, and have demanded more substantive governmental powers. They reiterate that, 
customarily, traditional leaders had governmental powers. Because their demands cannot be 
met within the framework of the Constitution, it appears that the new laws signal an 
accommodation with traditional leaders that will enable them to push the open-ended 
customary law arena to the limit.  
Yet chiefly versions of customary law are deeply disputed in many areas, especially in relation 
to the extortion of tribal levies, the selling of land allocations and unilateral mining and 
investment deals. The new laws change the balance of power in rural areas, making it much 
more difficult for rural people to challenge abuse of power by traditional leaders, or to hold 
them to account.  
The powers contained in the bill are not consistent with the underlying practices and values of 
customary law, which are consensual and based on voluntary affiliation and not on apartheid 
boundaries. In many areas customary courts continue to operate according to these 
principles, existing at all levels of society whether or not they are officially recognised under 
the Black Administration Act. Courts like that, run by respected and dedicated rural people do 
not need laws like this to prop them up. Instead of building on existing practice and positive 
changes in rural area, the bill uses the model of the 1927 Black Administration Act to prop up 
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colonial constructs of unilateral chiefly power. In line with that model the drafters of the bill did 
not consult ordinary rural people about how to support and enhance customary law and legal 
processes, but relied exclusively on the input of traditional leaders whose own interests are 
directly at stake.  
 
